A distinction can be made between "artificial classifications" and "natural classifications," where artifi-14 cial classifications may adequately serve some limited purposes, but natural classifications are overall most fruitful by allowing inference and 15 thus many different purposes. There is strong support for the view that a natural classification should be based on a theory (and, of course, 16 that the most fruitful theory provides the most fruitful classification). Nevertheless, atheoretical (or "descriptive") classifications are often 17 produced. Paradoxically, atheoretical classifications may be very successful. The best example of a successful "atheoretical" classification is 18 probably the prestigious Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) since its third edition from 1980. Based on such successes 19 one may ask: Should the claim that classifications ideally are natural and theory-based be reconsidered? This paper argues that the seemingly 20 success of atheoretical classifications hides deeper problems and that the ideal of theory-based classification should be maintained.
and vague concepts of dynamic psychiatry and re-1 placed them with a discrete system of classification 2 that treated mental disorders as discrete diseases. 3 This nosology rigorously segregated the pathologi-4 cal from the normal, in a way that the previous 5 psychodynamic model never did. 
